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PRISON LAW 
BEFORE AND AFTER WILSON V. SEITER: 
CASES CHALLENGING THE 
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT 
IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
I. INTRODUC'FION 
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that prisoners 
do not leave their civil rights at the prison or jail door.l The cruel 
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment2 
has consistently provided an avenue for prisoners to protest 
inadequate medical care, lack of safety measures, and inhumane 
conditions of confinement within the prisons. To determine if 
a challenged condition of confinement violated the eighth 
amendment prior to Wilson v. Seiter, 3 the courts applied an 
objective standard. The objective standard required the courts 
to consider whether a reasonable person would find that the con-
dition was so serious a deprivation of basic human needs that 
it offended the evolving standards of decency.' Recently the 
Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Seiter,6 added a subjective element 
to the standard. In addition to finding the challenged condition 
is objectively severe, an inquiry into the prison officials' state 
of mind must also be performed to determine if they were 
deliberately indifferent to the condition that resulted in the 
harm to the prisoner.s The deliberate indifference standard was 
used previously only in those cases where an individual prisoner 
1. See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964). See infra note 45 for a discussion of 
the case. 
2. U.S. CON ST. art. VIII. See infra note 8 for the text of the eighth amendment. 
3. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). See infra note 63 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the case. 
4. The standard is most comprehensively laid out in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337 (1981). To determine whether the condition was objectively severe the courts were 
required to analyze scientific and historical evidence concerning the challenged 
deprivation, as well as laws enacted outside of the prison context. [d. at 346-347. See 
infra note 58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case. 
5. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). 
6. [d. at 2322-2328. 
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was challenging the inadequate attention to his or her partic-
ular medical needs or personal safety. 7 
This article will examine the development of the standard 
for eighth amendment review used in cases challenging the con-
ditions of confinement before and after Wilson. It will begin 
with a examination of the interpretations of the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause in the Supreme Court. This arti-
cle will then analyze the objective standard for eighth amend-
ment review as applied by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in prison condition cases. After an analysis of the subjective 
standard for eighth amendment review established in Wilson 
u. Seiter, the article will survey how the Ninth Circuit and other 
circuits have applied this new standard. 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE STANDARD FOR EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT REVIEW 
A. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE MEANING OF CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution 
protects an individual from the imposition of cruel and unusu-
al punishment.8 Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the 
Supreme Court has struggled to determine the precise mean-
ing of this amendment as intended by the framers of the con-
stitution.9 The Court's interpretations have generally fallen 
within two categories: (1) a traditional interpretation based on 
7. See, e.g., Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) (See infra note 75 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the case) and Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 
457 (9th Cir. 1986) (See infra note 67 for a discussion of the case). 
8. U.S. CONST., art. VII., The Eighth Amendment reads as follows: 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. 
The eighth amendment has been applied to the states through the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. art. XIV. See Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660 (1962). 
9. See generally Note, The Eighth Amendment, Becarria, and the Enlightenment: 
An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment 
Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 783 (1969) (Hereinafter Beccaria). This article discusses the 
historical foundation of the eighth amendment and how the Supreme Court has inter-
preted this amendment, specifically in the Court's decision in Weems v. United States 
and its focus on the excessiveness rather than the barbarity of punishment. Id. See 
also Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 
57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969). See infra note 13 for a discussion of the article. 
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the Court's understanding of the English Bill of Rights and its 
prohibition on tortuous and barbarous punishment,10 and (2) 
a more expansive interpretation based on these English law 
prohibitions as well as concepts of excessiveness.ll 
1. The Traditional Interpretation 
The Supreme Court most frequently attributes the origin 
of the cruel and unusual punishment clause to the English Bill 
of Rights of 1688.12 The Court has often contemplated that this 
clause in the eighth amendment was intended to prohibit 
methods of punishment similar to those barred by the English 
Bill of Rights, 13 namely tortuous and barbaric methods of pun-
ishments.14 The traditional standard for reviewing the con-
stitutionality of a punishment has often focused, therefore, on 
the methods of punishment and whether these methods 
approach the level of cruelty or unusualness as those prohib-
ited under English Law. 16 
In In re Kemmler,18 the Supreme Court considered the 
issue of whether death by electrocution violated the eighth 
Id. 
10. See Becarria, 24 BUFF. L. REV. at 786-792. 
11. See Id. at 793-808. 
12. Id. at 788. 
It is the English Bill of Rights of 1689 which is said most 
often to be the origin of the phrase "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment" and the wording of the subsequent American Bill 
of rights, thus, has been seen as a mere verbatim copy with 
naturally a coextensive meaning. 
13. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 
57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 845-846 (1969). Granucci discusses the Framers misinterpreta-
tion of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the English Bill of Rights. He explains 
that they mistakenly interpreted the English Bill of Rights as barring barbarous meth-
ods of punishment in reaction to the treason trials of the "Bloody Assize" and thereby 
limiting the eighth amendments coverage to include only a ban on tortuous or barbarous 
methods of punishment such as quartering, thumb screws, etc. Granucci explains that 
the origin of the clause stems from the minority dissent of the House of Lords· in the Titus 
Oates case. The minority focused on the excessiveness of the punishment imposed on 
Oates as cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 856-859. 
14. Becarria, 24 BUFF. L.REV. at 788. Those punishments considered to be inher-
ently cruel include crucirtxion, quartering, disembowelment, burning at the stake, 
breaking on the wheel and subjection to the rack. Id. 
15. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). See infra note 16 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the case. 
16. 136 U.S. 436 (1890). Kemmler was found guilty and sentenced to death by elec-
trocution for the murder of his wife. The New York Supreme Court upheld the con-
viction and sentencing. Kemmler petitioned the Supreme Court on the ground that 
electricity was an unconstitutional mode of imposing death. The Supreme Court 
held that death by electricity was a humane method of execution. Id. at 447. 
3
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amendment. 17 The Court observed that only those punish-
ments that are equally as cruel as those meant to be pro-
scribed by the English Bill of Rights are prohibited by the 
constitution.18 The Court continued "that punishments are 
cruel if they involve torture or a lingering death; but the pun-
ishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word 
as used in the constitution. "19 The Supreme Court concluded that 
since electrocution is a quick and painless method of putting 
someone to death, it does not violate the eighth amendment.20 
The Supreme Court used a similar interpretation in 
Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber.21 The Court denied peti-
tioner's contention that a second electrocution, after the initial 
one had failed to kill him, would constitute cruel and unusu-
al punishment. 22 The Court found that this was not within 
the parameters of cruel and unusual punishment since "the cru-
elty against which the constitution protects a convicted man is 
cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the neces-
sary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish 
life humanely."23 Furthermore, since there was no intention on 
the part of the state or the executioner to impose unnecessary 
pain on petitioner,24 this previously determined humane mode 
of punishment25 would not be rendered cruel and unusual. 26 
2. The Expansive Interpretation 
The Supreme Court has also interpreted the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause to prohibit more than just the 
imposition of barbarous or tortuous methods punishment. In 
17. Id. The court also considered whether death by electrocution violated the cruel 
and unusual clause of the New York constitution, which,like most states, is identical 
to the United States constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 440. 
18. Id. at 446. 
19. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446. 
20. Id. at 443. 
21. 329 U.S. 452 (1946). 
22. Id. at 463-464. 
23. Id. at 464. 
24. Id. The court noted that the failure of the execution was an accident. Id. 
25. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1910). 
26. See Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463-464. The court indicated that "prohibition 
against the wanton infliction of pain," is directly attributable to the English Bill of 
Rights.Id. at 463. The Court appears to be indicating that absent a showing that the 
method of execution is cruel or unusual or that the state or executioner intended to 
subject the petitioner to the unnecessary pain of a repeat electrocution no constitu-
tional violation can be found. Id. This observation is what the Supreme Court in Wilson 
relied upon in part to require a state of mind inquiry in cases challenging the con-
stitutionality of conditions of confinement. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2322-2323 (1991). 
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Weems v. United States,27 the Supreme Court noted that the 
framers had surely intended to prohibit more than just tortu-
ous and barbarous punishments.28 The Court interpreted the 
clause as "progressive, .... not fastened to the obsolete, but (able 
to) acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by 
a humane justice."29 The Court, relying on the dissent from 
O'Neil v. Vermont, 30 held that the imposition of a 15-year sen-
tence of hard labor was excessive in proportion to the offense 
committed, and was therefore in violation of the eighth amend-
ment.31 The Supreme Court in Weems expanded the interpre-
tation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause to prohibit 
more than punishments which include physical pain.32 If a pun-
ishment is so severe or excessive that it is disproportionate to 
the crime, the eighth amendment is violated.33 
In Trop v. Dulles34 the issue before the court was whether 
denationalization,36 the penalty for wartime desertion, was 
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment.36 
The Supreme Court agreed with Weems 37 that the meaning of 
27. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The issue before the court was whether the imposition 
ofa sentence of 15 years hard labor for the crime of falsifying government documents 
was cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning ofthe Eighth amendment. The 
Court held that the punishment was cruel and unusual due to its excessive and 
unusual character.ld. at 377. 
28. Id. at 372. 
29. Id. at 377. 
30. 144 U.S. 323 (1892). A man was convicted of307 violations of the Vermont 
liquor laws and sentenced to 54 years of hard labor.ld at 330. The majority refused 
to discuss the constitutionality of the contested punishment since the eighth amend-
ment did not apply to the states.ld. Justices Field, Harlan and Brewer in their dis-
sent, observed that the eighth amendment did apply to the states through the 
fourteenth amendment and that the eighth amendment was meant to prohibit tortuous 
methods of punishment as well as excessive or severe punishments that were gross-
ly disproportionate to the offenses. Justice Field stated: 
54 years confinement at hard labor, away from one's home 
and relatives, and thereby prevented from giving assistance 
to them or receiving comfort from them, is a punishment at 
the severity of which, considering the offenses, it is hard to 
believe that any man of right feeling and hearing can refrain 
from shuddering ... the punishment was greatly beyond any-
thing required by any humane law for the offenses. 
Id. at 339-340. 
31. Weems, 217 U.S. at 379. 
32. Id. at 372. 
33.Id. 
34. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
35. Denationalization is a penalty in which an individual's citizenship is taken 
away and the individual is rendered stateless. 
36. Trop, 356 U.S. 86. 
37. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
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the eighth amendment was not intended to be static.S8 The 
Court observed that the eighth amendment "must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society."89 The Court held that although 
the punishment involved no physical torture, destroying an 
individual's status in society was cruel and unusual punish-
ment in accord with society's standards of decency.40 Justice 
Brennan, in his concurring opinion, used a concept of exces-
siveness similar to Weems. 41 Brennan observed that dena-
tionalization was an excessive punishment, when compared 
with other forms of punishment available for desertion, because 
it was an inefficient and unnecessary way to attain the legit-
imate penal aims of deterrence and rehabilitation.43 
The Supreme Court has used the progressive interpretation 
of the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment 
clause set forth in Weems and Trop in many subsequent cases, 
most significantly to find under what circumstances the death 
penalty is, and is not, unconstitutional. 48 The Supreme Court 
38. Trap, 356 U.S. at 101. 
39. [d. The Court also noted that the cruel and unusual punishment clause was 
taken from the English Bill of Rights, and the principle it represents was taken from 
the Magna Carta; thus, the underlying concept of the eighth amendment is the dig-
nity of man. [d. at 100. 
40. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102. The Court further noted that denationalization, 
... is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for 
it destroys for the individual the political existence that 
was centuries in the development. The punishment strips the 
citizen of his status in the national and international polit-
ical community. 
[d. at 101-102. 
41. [d. at 110 (Brennan J., concurring). 
42. [d. at 111 (Brennan J., concurring) Brennan explained that denationaliza-
tion is the antithesis of rehabilitation, for instead of helping the individual to become 
a useful member of society, it makes him an outcast. Further, since the ramifications 
of denationalization are not yet known, it would not be an effective deterrent measure. 
Brennan noted that penal aims would be more successfully achieved by an alternate 
method of punishment. [d. at 113-114. (Brennan, J., concurring) 
43. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The issue was whether the imposition 
of the death penalty for the rape cases before the court was cruel and unusual 
punishment. The Supreme Court held that the death penalty in those cases constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Brennan, in the concurring opinion, 408 
U.S. 238, 256-305 (J. Brennan, concurring), thought that the death penalty should be 
eliminated in all situations. [d. at 256-305. He stated that "(t)he punishment of death 
stands condemned as fatally offensive to human dignity.- [d. at 305. But cr., Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), holding that a Georgia law imposing the death 
penalty for murder did not violate the eighth amendment and that the death 
penalty was not unconstitutional. [d. at 187. The Court reached this decision using 
the expanded interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Contrary 
to Furman, the court found that the death penalty "comports with the basic concept 
of human dignity" and serves the legitimate penal purposes of retribution and deter-
rence; therefore, it is a justified and necessary punishment. 1d. at 182. 
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has also used the concept of excessiveness in subsequent 
decisions to find that certain punishments and penal practices 
are unconstitutional." 
B. THE APPLICATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO PRISON 
CONDITION CASES 
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that a prisoner 
does not leave his civil rights at the prison door.46 Certain 
conditions of prison confinement have been held to be a part 
of punishment and therefore subject to scrutiny under the 
broad interpretation of the eighth amendment.46 In Estelle 
v. Gamble" the Supreme Court applied the eighth amend-
ment to prisons, noting that the Constitution imposes a duty 
upon the state to protect the prisoners' safety and well being.48 
This duty exists because the state has taken away the pris-
oners' liberty, and the prisoners are thus unable to care for 
themselves.49 Estelle did not specifically deal with prison con-
ditions but rather whether the inadequate treatment of an 
individual prisoner's medical needs constituted cruel and 
44. See, e.g, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), holding that a state law 
making the status of narcotics addiction a criminal offense, punishable by at least 90 
days in jail, was cruel and unusual punishment. The Court held that narcotics 
addiction was an illness, not a crime, and therefore not only was this punishment dis-
proportionate, but also since it did not attempt to provide any medical or psycholog-
ical aid to the addict, it did not serve any legitimate purpose. rd. at 675-675. See also, 
e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Justice Marshall in his concurring opin-
ion indicated that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment because of its 
excessiveness. He observed that it serves no legitimate penal purpose more effectively 
than the less severe punishment of life imprisonment. rd. at 358-359. (See infra note 
43 for a discussion of the case) and see O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892). (See 
infra note 30 and the accompanying text for a discussion of this case). 
45. See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964). In this case a prisoner filed a civil 
rights complaint against the Illinois State Penitentiary on the grounds that he was 
not allowed to purchase certain religious pUblications and denied other privileges just 
because of his religion. The Supreme Court held that the complaint stated a valid cause 
of action. rd. at 546. 
46. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) and Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 
(1978) (See infra notes 47 and 53 and the accompanying text for a discussion of these 
cases). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). (See infra notes 58-62 and 
accompanying text for a discussion ofthis case). 
47. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In this case a prisoner in a Texas state prison brought a 
suit against the medical director and two prison officials claiming that his eighth 
amendment rights were violated because he was inadequately treated for a back 
il\iury allegedly sustained during prison work. The court denied his claim because he 
was unable to prove that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his existing 
medical needs. rd. at 103-105. 
48. rd. at 103. 
49. rd. at 103-104. 
7
Rubin: Prison Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
214 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:207 
unusual punishment. 60 The Court held that the only way for a 
prisoner to successfully challenge a deprivation of medical 
treatment was to show that the medical personnel or prison 
officials were deliberately indifferent to his treatment needs, 
for only such indifference constitutes the wanton infliction of 
pain prohibited by the eighth amendment. 51 Since the prison-
er was only able to provide evidence that the prison and med-
ical personnel were at most inattentive or negligent to his 
needs, the eighth amendment was not violated. 53 
Hutto v. Finney53 was the first Supreme Court case to 
specifically acknowledge that conditions of confinement are 
a part of the punishment subject to eighth amendment 
scrutiny. The Court in Hutto focused on the objective harm 
to the prisoners caused by the challenged conditions of con-
finement54 and not on the prison official's state of mind 
relied as required in Estelle. 55 The eighth amendment, the 
Court noted, prohibits severely disproportionate punish-
ments56 and punishments that violate "broad and idealistic 
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and 
decency. "57 
50. [d. at 101. 
51. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 
52. [d. Two important Supreme Court cases followed the reasoning in Estelle to 
deny the prisoners' claims. In Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied ,479 U.S. 816 (1986) the court held that prisoners' eighth amendment 
claims were invalid because they failed to show that the prison officials acted with delib-
erate or reckless indifference to the prisoners. [d. at 652. The claims stemmed from 
injuries sustained in a bus fire while being transported between prisons. [d. at 648. 
In Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) the Court held that, like in Estelle, pris-
oners must prove a mental element. However, instead of deliberate indifference, a pris-
oner must show that the prison officials acted maliciously and sadistically in cases 
concerning whether a particular prison security measure posed a risk to the prison-
ers' safety in violation of the eighth amendment. [d. at 319. 
53. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). The Court considered the validity of certain remedial 
orders issued by the district court and affirmed by the Eighth Circuit after a finding 
that conditions within the Arkansas penal system constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment. The contested orders limited the amount of time that a prisoner could 
be put in punitive isolation and awarded attorneys' fees and costs as a sanction for fail-
ing to cure other eighth amendment violations. {d. at 680-688. The Supreme Court 
upheld the validity of the remedial orders. [d. at 688 - 689. 
54. [d. at 685. 
55. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The Court noted that the district court appropriately ana-
lyzed whether indeterminate sentencing in the punitive isolation cells violated con-
temporary standards of decency. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685. 
56. [d. at 685 (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 367. See infra note 27 for a discussion 
of Weems). 
57. [d. (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (1968Xholding that the use 
of the strap on prisoners in Arkansas prison was cruel and unusual punishment in vio-
lation of eighth amendment and enjoiningthe prison from its use. 
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In Rhodes v. Chapman,68 the Court considered whether 
double celling&9 prisoners constituted an eighth amendment 
violation.5O The court observed that when determining whether 
an eighth amendment violation has occurred, the court must, 
as much as possible, use objective factors measured against 
society's standards of decency as to the effect of the depri-
vation.81 After reviewing relevant scientific evidence about 
double ceIling, the Court concluded that double celling did 
not offend contemporary standards of decency in violation of 
the eighth amendment.82 
The most recent Supreme Court case concerning uncon-
stitutionality of conditions of confinement, Wilson v. Seiter, 63 
has added to the standard regarding prison deprivations set 
forth in Hutto and Rhodes. The Court observed that condi-
tions of confinement are not part of the punishment formal-
ly meted out by a statute or judge.1U Therefore, in order to 
have any eighth amendment violation as to conditions, the 
prisoner must show that the prison officials intended to pun-
ish or at least were deliberately indifferent as to whether 
the condition was punishment.86 Prior to this decision, a 
requirement that the prison officials had a purpose or intent 
to inflict harm was only required for cases involving medical 
treatment or guard brutality.88 
58. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
59. Double celling is placing two prisoners in a cell designed to accommodate one 
prisoner. 
60. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 339. 
61. Id. at 346-347. 
62. Id. 
63. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). The court considered the issue of whether certain con-
ditions of confinement within the Ohio prison violated the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause of the eighth amendment. The Court relied on Whitley v. Albers, 475 
U.S. 312 (1986) (See infra note 52 for a discussion Whitley.) and observed that there 
is a distinction between punishment formally imposed for a crime and conditions of 
confinement. Id. at 2323-2324. The Court then relied on Francis v. Resweber, 329 
U.S. 459 (1947) and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (See infra notes 26 and 47-
51 and accompanying text for a discussion of Resweber and Estelle.) as supporting the 
proposition that for those punishments not formally meted out such as the conditions 
of confinement, an inquiry into the state of mind of the prison officials must be per-
formed.Id. at 2323. The Court held a violation of the eighth amendment exists only 
ifit can be shown that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent. [d. at 2326-
2327. 
64. Wilson, III S. Ct. at 2324. 
65. [d. 
66. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See infra notes 47-51 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the case. 
9
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C. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT 
IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT PRIOR TO WILSON 
The Ninth Circuit has also had occasion to apply the con-
stitutional protection against cruel and unusual conditions 
of confinement afforded to prisoners through the eighth amend-
ment. Prior to Wilson, the Ninth Circuit had consistently 
used the objective standard for prison condition cases focusing 
on the harm caused by the challenged conditions of confinement 
when determining if a eighth amendment violation had 
occurred.67 
In Spain v. Procunier,68 the Ninth Circuit considered the 
constitutionality of certain prison conditions and practices in 
San Quentin prison.69 The court held that use of dangerous 
amounts of tear gas violated society's contemporary standard 
of decency70 and could only legitimately be used in certain sit-
uations.71 It also held that excessive use of mechanical 
restraints was dehumanizing and violated the minimum 
standards of decency protected by the eighth amendment.72 
67. However, the Ninth Circuit had applied the subjective deliberate indifference 
standard to medical treatment and prisoner security cases. See, e.g., Berg v. Kincheloe, 
794 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1986). In this case a prisoner claimed that his eighth amend-
ment rights had been violated due to the prison officials disregard for his personal safe-
ty which caused him to be beaten and raped. Id. at 458. The Ninth Circuit held that 
the prisoner had raised a valid eighth amendment claim concerning one of the prison 
officials and observed that the deliberate indifference standard would be appropriate 
to determine if this official violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause byexpos-
ing Berg to a threat of serious harm or injury by another prisoner. Id. at 459. See 
also Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1991), holding that in order for the 
prisoner to bring a valid eighth amendment claim concerning his deprivation of med-
ical treatment and personal security, he must prove that prison officials acted with 
deliberate indifference.ld. at 1347. 
68. 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979). Six San Quentin prisoners, also known as the 
San Quentin Six, were involved in the protest over prison conditions that occurred at 
San Quentin in which some inmates and prison officials were killed. The San Quentin 
six brought suit against the prison for certain allegedly unconstitutional conditions 
and practices of confinement, including (1) excessive use oftear gas, (2) unreasonable 
use of mechanical restraints, and (3) denial of any outdoor exercise. Id. at 193-200. 
69.ld. 
70. Id. at 196, (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,102 (1976) (quoting Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958». 
71. Procunier, 600 F. 2d at 196. The court continued that this holding was not 
a ban on the use of tear gas in the prison but only a prohibition against the unjusti-
fied use of dangerous quantities of tear gas. Use of non-dangerous amounts of tear gas 
does not violate society standards of decency.ld. 
72. Id. The court found that use of mechanical restraints during out of cell move-
ments was "excessive, painful and degrading." Id. The Court found that the use of the 
mechanical restraints were particularly unjustified when visiting with friends, rel-
atives and counsel.ld. at 197. 
10
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The court observed that even though there was no finding that 
the prison officials intentionally shackled the prisoners to 
punish them for the deaths of their fellow guards, wrongful 
intent is only one element of eighth amendment review and 
is not dispositive.73 The state-of-mind of the prison official is 
something to consider when analyzing whether the punish-
ment advances a legitimate penal purpose, but a eighth 
amendment violation may be found without a wrongful state-
of-mind being shown.74 
In Franklin v. State of Oregon,76 the Ninth Circuit held 
that a prisoner's complaint concerning inadequate ventila-
tion, exercise and lighting were valid eighth amendment 
claims.78 The court also held that housing a prisoner with lung 
cancer with a heavy smoker and denying the prisoner food after 
being informed that he was having an insulin reaction were 
potential eighth amendment violations.77 Following Estelle, 78 
the court observed, however, that for eighth amendment chal-
lenges involving medical mistreatment, the prisoner must not 
only show that his health was seriously threatened, but that 
the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medi-
cal needs. 79 
In Hoptowit v. Spellman80 the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
district court's conclusion that many of the prison conditions 
in the Washington State Prison were a serious threat to the 
73. Procunier, 600 F.2d at 197. 
74. [d. 
75. 662 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981). The plaintiff, a prisoner in an Oregon state 
prison, had filed various complaints concerning unconstitutional conditions of con-
finement, including (1) inadequate ventilation,lighting and exercise, (2)placing him 
in a cell with a heavy cigarette smoker which was seriously dangerous to his health 
since he had lung cancer, and (3) failing to provide him with food after he informed 
the prison that he was having an insulin reaction. The court held that complaint (1) 
was a legitimate eighth amendment issue after Procunier and that complaints (2) and 
(3) also raised valid eighth amendment claims provided he could show that the prison 
officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs as required by Estelle. [d. 
at 1347. 
76. [d. The court cited Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979) as precedent for 
its holding. [d. at 1346. 
77. Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1347. 
78. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See infra notes 47-51 for a discussion ofthis case. 
79. Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1347. 
80. 753 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985). In this case the Ninth Circuit held that inad-
equate lighting and ventilation, unsatisfactory plumbing, substandard fire prevention 
and food service, vermin infestation,lack of maintenance, safety hazards in the occu-
pational areas, and inadequate cell cleaning fell -below the minimum standards of 
decency and violated plaintiffs' eighth amendment rights.· [d. at 783. 
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prisoners' physical and mental health81 and their safety.82 
The court held these conditions fell below the "minimum 
standards of decency"83 and amounted to a eighth amend-
ment violation.84 
In McKinney v. Anderson,86 the Ninth Circuit held that the 
eighth amendment is violated when inmates are exposed to 
levels of Environmental Tobacco Smoke {"ETS")88 that pose an 
unreasonable threat to their health.8T The court held that soci-
ety's attitude has evolved to a point where exposing an unwill-
ing prisoner to dangerous levels of ETS violates contemporary 
standards of decency.88 The court also held that this exposure 
was unconstitutional even without exploring the evolving stan-
dards of decency because courts had already determined that con-
ditions of confinement that pose an unreasonable risk to a 
prisoner's health are unconstitutiona1.89 The Fifth,90 Sixth,91 
81. Id. 
82.Id. 
83.Id. 
84. Hoptowit, 753 F.2d at 783. 
85. 924 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Oct. 15 
1991)(No. 91-269) (vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Wilson). 
86. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1502. Environmental tobacco smoke, as opposed to 
mainstream cigarette smoke, which is the smoke that smokers draw directly into their 
lungs, is made up of mainstream smoke and sidestream smoke that cigarettes emit 
between puffs. Id. at 1502. The toxic and carcinogenic effects of both are similar. Id. 
at 1505 (citing U.S. Dep't of Health and Welfare, The Health consequences of 
Involuntary Smoking, A Report of the Surgeon General 7 (1986). 
87. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1507. 
88. Id. at 1508. The court relied on Avery v. Powell, 652 F. Supp. 632 (D.N.H. 
1988) and Clemmons v. Bohannon, 918 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1990) to support its hold-
ing. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1504-1505. 
In Avery, the court held valid a claim that a prisoners' eighth amendment rights 
were violated because his constant exposure to ETS was harmful to his health. Avery, 
652 F. Supp. at 641. 
In Clemmons, the Tenth Circuit found that exposing a prisoner to an unreasonable 
risk of debilitating disease or death violated evolving standards of decency. Clemmons, 
918 F.2d at 866. The court held the prisoner's claim, that involuntary exposure to ETS 
is cruel and unusual punishment, was a valid eight amendment claim. Id. at 863. 
89. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1507. The court relied onProcunier, 600 F.2d 201 and 
Hoptowit, 753 F.2d 779, as having established that prisoners had a constitutional right 
to clean air; thus exposure to ETS would be unconstitutional per se, without an 
investigation into contemporary standards of decency. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1507. 
90. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). The court found that 
the discriminatory practices, the condition of the physical facilities, the inadequacy 
of the medical treatment afforded the prisoners and other conditions offended mod-
ern concepts of decency in violation of the eighth amendment. Id. at 1299-1302. 
91. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1977). The Sixth Circuit 
held that petitioner's claim that the jailers deliberately withheld food from him in 
order to coerce an confession for a offense committed in jail was a claim subject to scruti-
ny under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment. Id. at 660. 
12
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Eighth,92 and Tenth93 Circuits have also used the objective 
standard to find that certain conditions of confinement in the 
state prisons violated the eighth amendment. 
III. WILSON V. SEITER - APPLICATION OF THE 
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD TO PRISON 
CONDITIONS CASES 
A. THE MAJORITY 
In Wilson v. Seiter9" the Court held that the deliberate 
indifference standard must be used when what is contested is 
not part of the punishment formally imposed by a statute or a 
sentencing judge.96 The Court relied on its past decisions in 
Resweber,B8 Estelle,B7 and Whitley9s to show that a state-of-
mind inquiry must take place when determining whether a con-
dition of confinement is cruel and unusual punishment.99 The 
92. See, e.g., Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1985). The court held that 
petitioners' claims regarding the unhealthiness of the physical condition of the 
prison, the inadequate diet and lack of personal hygiene items raised valid eighth 
amendment claims. Id. at 1338. 
93. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (lOth Cir. 1989). The court held that 
certain conditions at the Colorado prison, including inadequate sanitation, diet, safe-
ty and medical care, failed to provide prisoners with the "basic human needs" and vio-
lated the eighth amendment.ld. at 585-586. 
94. 111 S. Ct. 2321(1991) (opinion by J. Scalia, with whon Rehnquist C.J., 
O'Conner, Kennedy and Souter J.J. joins. White J. filed concurring opinion in which 
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens J.J. joined). 
95. Id. at 2322-2328. The prisoners claimed that the conditions of confinement 
at the Ohio Prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The prisoners com-
plained of overcrowding, excessive noise, unsanitary conditions, and dirty lavatories. 
They also stated that the prison was too hot in the summer and too cold in the win-
ter, the food was prepared in unsanitary conditions and physically and mentally ill 
prisoners were intermingled with other prisoners, posing threats to their health and 
safety. Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 863,864 (6th Cir. 1990). 
96. 329 U.S. 459 (1947). See infra note 26 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of this case. 
97. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the case. 
98. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). In this case a prisoner claimed that 
he was subject to cruel and unusual punishment when he was shot by a guard who was 
trying to quell a prison disturbance. Id. The Court held that in situations where prison 
officials have to make split second decisions as to whether to use force and end a protest 
or let the disturbance persist, the appropriate inquiry is whether force was used in good 
faith to restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing 
harm.ld. at 319. 
99. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326. The Sixth Circuit applied the Whitley standard to 
the prisoners claim that the conditions of confinement violated the eighth amendment 
in Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court held that 
13
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Court observed that Resweber emphasized that a violation of 
the eighth amendment required a "wanton infliction of pain. "100 
In Resweber, since the infliction of a repeat electrocution was 
due to an accident, the prison officials lacked the culpable 
state of mind to make the punishment cruel. 101 The Court also 
observed that it had applied this culpability requirement in 
Estelle for deprivations suffered during imprisonment that 
were not specifically part of the punishment.102 Finally, the 
Court observed that its recent decision in Whitley confirmed 
that a mental element is required in prison condition cases 
where the conduct challenged is not part of the punishment for-
mally meted out by a sentencing judge. los The Court conclud-
ed that collectively these cases demand that a subjective 
inquiry into the prison officials' state-of-mind must be per-
formed when determining whether a violation of the eighth 
amendment has occurred in cases challenging the conditions 
of confinement. 104 ' 
The Court rejected the position that there should be a dis-
tinction between short-term or one time conditions, such as the 
use of force to quell a prison disturbance that would require a 
state-of-mind inquiry,' and ongoing conditions. lo6 The Court 
also rejected the distinction drawn by the concurrence between 
the Sixth Circuit was correct in determining that a mental element was required but 
that the appropriate standard was deliberate indifference, not the malicious and 
sadistic standard. Wilson III S. Ct. at 2328. 
100. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463. 
101. Id. at 464. 
102. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2322 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (See infra notes 
47-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case). 
103. Id. The Court cited a passage from Whitley in support of this proposition. 
Id. at 2323. 
After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. To be cruel and unusu-
al punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punish-
ment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due 
care for the prisoner's interests or safety ... lt is obduracy 
and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith 
that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs 
in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, 
supplying medical needs or restoring official control over a 
tumultuous cellblock. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. 
104. Wilson, III S. Ct. 2323. 
105. Id. at 2325. This position was presented by the United States as amicus 
curaie in support of the prisoners. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on 
Writ of Certiorari to The United States Court of Appeals for The Sixth Circuit at 11-
13, Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861 (1991) (No. 89-7376). 
14
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specific acts or omissions aimed at individual prisoners at 
issue in Whitley, Resweber, and Estelle and general conditions 
of confinement. t08 The Court observed that there was no basis 
for these distinctions, and furthermore, it is not the inclinations 
of the courts that created the subjective element for eighth 
amendment review, it is the meaning inherent in the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause which required a state-of-mind 
inquiry. to? To be considered punishment, acts must be 
deliberately intended to chastise or deter. lOB Conditions of con-
finement are not part of the punishment imposed for these 
penological purposes by the judge or a statute and cannot be 
considered a part of the punishment. l09 Only when some men-
tal element is shown on the part of the prison officials does a 
challenged condition of confinement qualify as a punishment 
subject to eighth amendment scrutiny.110 The court concluded, 
in light of past decisions and the meaning inherent in the 
cruel and unusual punishment clause, a state-of-mind inquiry 
is necessary in determining whether conduct that is not part 
of the penalty violates the constitution. 111 
In discussing what type of state-of-mind inquiry is appli-
cable,112 the Court relied on dictum from Whitley.113 The Court 
observed that once conduct is determined to be objectively 
severe,114 whether the resulting harm was wanton depends 
upon the constraints facing the prison official.116 Because prison 
officials face the same constraints handling medical condi-
tions as any other conditions of confinement, the Estelle 
deliberate indifference standard should be used in both 
106. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F. 2d 645 (7th Cir 1985). (See 
infra note 52 for a discussion of the case.) The Court quoted Judge Posner: 
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to 
chastise or deter. This is what the word mean~ today, it is 
what it meant in the eighteenth century .... [I]f [a] guard 
accidentally stepped on [a] prisoner's toe and broke it, this 
would not be punishment in anything remotely like the 
accepted meaning of the word, whether we consult the usage 
of 1791, or 1868 or 1985. Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 652. 
Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2324. 
109. [d. 
110. [d. 
111. [d. at 2326. 
112. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326. The Court explained objective severity as con-
duct that satisfies the Rhodes evolving standards of decency test. [d. 
113. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319·321 (1986). 
114. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326. 
115. [d. 
15
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situations.u6 The Court rejected the stricter malicious and 
sadistic standard applied in Whitley, because the prison officials 
are faced with different constraints when acting in response to 
the more threatening circumstances of a prison disturbance. 117 
B. THE CONCURRENCEu8 
The concurrence agreed with the majority in judgment 
only.u9 The concurrence strongly disagreed that prisoners who 
challenge the conditions of confinement within a prison must 
show deliberate indifference by the prison officials.120 The con-
currence disagreed with the majority's holding for three rea-
sons: it is contrary to precedent, it will be impossible to apply, 
and it will create a easy defense to any constitutional 
challenge.121 
The concurrence tacitly rejected the majority's conclusion 
that a mental element is required because the conditions of con-
finement are not part of the punishment formally meted out by 
the sentencing judge or statute.122 The concurrence observed 
that the Court had previously held in Hutto l23 and Rhodes 124 that 
although not formally imposed by a sentencing judge or statute, 
conditions of confinement are part of the punishment subject 
to eighth amendment scrutiny.l26 As part of the punishment, 
l16. [d. This reasoning was derived from Lafaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 
1987) (involving a complaint by a paraplegic inmate that the prison officials violated 
the eighth amendment due to the inhumane conditions of his confinement and 
their failure to provide him with needed physical therapy). The Court noted that Lalaut 
established that whether the prisoner's treatment is c;haracterized as inadequate atten-
tion to his medical needs or inhumane conditions of confinement, Estelle's deliberate 
indifference standard should be used. Lafaut, 834 F.2d at 391-392. Wilson, l11 S. Ct. 
2326. 
l17. [d. at 2328. The court concluded that the Sixth Circuit erred in applying the 
Whitley standard and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the opinion. 
The court noted that since the Sixth Circuit had found that the prison officials acted 
with at most mere negligence, using the deliberate indifference standard instead of 
Whitley's malicious and sadistic standard will not change the outcome ofthe case. [d. 
l18. Wilson, l11 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (1991)(White, J., Marshall, J., Blackmun, J. 
and Stevens, J. concurring). 
l19. [d. 
120. [d. 
121. [d. at 2328-2330. 
122. Wilson, l11 S. Ct. at 2328. The concurrence observed that the majority did 
not dispute that the intent element is not needed when the pain and suffering com-
plained of is part of the punishment imposed on convicted prisoners. [d. 
123. 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
124. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
125. Wilson, l11 S. Ct. at 2328-2329. 
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the objective severity of the conditions and not the prison offi-
cials' state of mind must be examined when determining if the 
eighth amendment has been violated. 126 
The concurrence argued that the majority's reliance upon 
Resweber, 127 Estelle l28 and Whitleyl29 to support the necessity of 
an intent element in prison condition cases was misplaced. ISO 
These cases challenged specific acts or omissions directed at 
individual prisoners. 131 A state-of-mind inquiry was required 
because these cases concerned conduct which was aimed at par-
ticular prisoners in isolated incidents which did "not purport 
to be punishment at all. "132 Because these cases did not involve 
conduct that was part of punishment, they were inappropriate 
precedent to establish that an intent element is necessary in 
cases concerning prison conditions, since prison conditions 
have been held to be part of punishment.13s 
The concurrence pointed out the difficulty of applying the 
subjective standard as an additional reason why only the 
objective conditions of confinement should be examined. IS' It 
observed that it will be very difficult to determine whose 
intent should be scrutinized, since conditions of confinement 
often result from the actions and omissions of numerous prison 
officials in and out of the prison. 136 The concurrence noted 
that the majority did not address how this problem will be dealt 
with and that "[iJn truth intent simply is not very meaningful 
when considering a challenge to an institution such as a prison 
126. Id. The concurrence quoted language from Rhodes: 
Id. at 2328. 
Conditions (of confinement) ...• may deprive inmates of the 
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Such condi-
tions could be cruel and unusual under the contemporary 
standards of decency .... Rhodes. 452 U.S. at 347. 
127. 329 U.S. 459 (1947). 
128. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
129. 475 U.S. 312 (1986). 
130. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2329. 
131. Id. In Resweber. 329 U.S. 459 (1947) the prisoner challenged the constitu-
tionality of subjecting him to a repeat execution. In Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) the pris-
oner challenged the inadequate attention to his serious medical needs. Whitley, 475 
U.S. 312 (1986) concerned a prisoner's challenge to the constitutionality of a prison 
guard shooting him during the course of a prison riot. 
132. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2329 (quoting Whitley. 475 U.S. at 319). 
133. Id. The concurrence cited Gillespe v. Crawford. 833 F.2d 47. 50 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(per curiam) as establishing this argument. 
134. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2329. 
135. Id. at 2330. 
17
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system."138 This is why, noted the concurrence, lower courts 
have consistently applied the objective standard.137 
The concurrence indicated that the most significant and 
potentially dangerous result of the majority's holding is that it will 
open up the possibility for a easy defense to an eighth amendment 
claim. l38 Prison officials will be able to claim that it is inade-
quate funds, not a wrongful state of mind, that has created the con-
tested conditions of confinement. 139 The concurrence concluded that 
inhumane conditions of confinement should not be shielded from 
eighth amendment scrutiny due to inadequate funding. 14O Having 
made the choice to use prisons as a form of punishment, each state 
must take responsibility to ensure that the conditions in its pris-
ons comport with contemporary standards of decency. 141 A require-
ment of deliberate indifference will mean that serious deprivations 
of basic human needs in the prisons will go unredressed. 142 
IV. AFTER WILSON - THE APPLICATION OF THE 
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD IN THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT 
Only a small number of decisions concerning cruel and 
unusual conditions of confinement the prisons have been 
handed down by the Ninth Circuit since Wilson. 143 
136. 1d. 
137. 1d. at n.1. 
138. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2330. 
139. 1d. For example, if a prisoner complains about inadequate nutrition or 
sanitation the prison officials can claim it is budget considerations that created the 
unhealthy environment and not their intent to harm the prisoners. 
140. 1d. The majority addressed this issue briefly in response to the amicus brief 
filed by the U.S. Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae on Writ of Certiorari to 
The United States Court of Appeals for The Sixth Circuit at 11-13, Wilson v. Seiter, 893 
F.2d 861 (1990). It acknowledged that fiscal constraints may provide a defense to 
eighth amendment challenges, but it cannot bear on the meaning of the intent require-
ment that is implicit in the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2325. 
Further, the majority stated that the "cost" defense was not an issue in the case.1d. 
141. 1d. 
142. 1d. 
143. See Smith v. McCarthy, 937 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 89-15540) 
(unpublished disposition, text in WESTLA W, Allfeds Library) (See infra note 144 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of this case). See also Redman v. San Diego, 942 
F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991). (See infra note 151 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the case); Whitmore v. Sumner, 944 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991)(Table) (No. 89-15861) 
(unpublished disposition, text in WESTLA W, Allfeds Library) (See infra note 161 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the text); Jordon v. Gardner, _ F.2d _ (9th 
Cir. 1992) 1992 WL 2084; Lane v. Martinak, _ F.2d _ (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 
90-35805) (unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library); and Schultz 
v. Goldsmith, 942 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 90-16620) (unpublished dis-
position, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library). 
18
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In Smith v. McCarthyl44 the Ninth Circuit held that the pris-
oner's challenge to certain conditions in administrative con-
finement, namely inadequate shelter and lack of outdoor 
exercise, presented valid eighth amendment claims. 146 The 
court cited Hoptowit 146 as establishing both that all prisoners 
must be afforded eighth amendment protection, including 
those in administrative segregation, and that prisoners must 
be provided adequate shelter.147 The court observed that 
Procunierl48 established that denial of outdoor exercise may con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment.149 The court concluded, 
however, that after Wilson these claims will only be successful 
if the petitioner can show that the prison officials acted with 
deliberate indifference.16o Although the Ninth Circuit adopt-
ed the deliberate indifference standard in this case, it did not 
indicate what the petitioner will have to prove to show such 
indifference. 
In Redman v. San Diego161 the issue before the court was 
whether improperly placing a pre-trial detainee in a danger-
ous situation, despite his pleas for protection, violated his 
fourteenth amendment due process right to personal security. 162 
The court held that deliberate indifference was the appropriate 
standard to use when determining if an inmate's right of per-
sonal security had been violated. 163 Deliberate indifference 
144. 937 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 89-15540)(unpublished disposition 
text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library). A prisoner claimed that his eighth amendment 
rights were violated when he was arbitrarily moved from general population to 
administrative segregation. In administrative segregation he claimed he was denied 
outdoor exercise and adequate shelter. [d. 
145. [d. (citing Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) as establishing the deliberate indif-
ference standard). The court held that Smith's contention that he was arbitrarily placed 
in segregation, subject to retaliatory action by the prison officials, and that the 
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and safety and used exces-
sive force in stopping a prison riot, as well as the contention that the defendants were 
racially discriminatory, lacked merit. [d. 
146. 753 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985). 
147. Smith, 937 F.2d 613. 
148. 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979). 
149. Smith, 937 F.2d 613 (citing Procunier ,600 F.2d at 199-200.). 
150. [d. 
151. 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991). Redman, a pre-trial detainee who was 
repeatedly raped by another inmate despite his pleas for protection, filed a com-
plaint against the prison officials and the County of San Diego alleging his fourteenth 
amendment due process rights were violated. He alleged that his rights were violated 
because the defendants committed acts that deprived him of his rights to personal secu-
rity. [d. at 1439. (Since Redman was a pre-trial detainee and had not been convict-
ed of a crime, he had to posture his action as a deprivation of substantive due process 
rights instead of a violation of the eighth amendment.). [d. 
152. [d. at 1439. 
153. Redman, 942 F.2d at 1443. 
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was shown on the part of the county and the prison officials 
because they were responsible for developing and implement-
ing the procedural policies and customs which maintained 
the overcrowding in the jails. 154 This overcrowding knowingly 
resulted in a lack of supervision, which created safety problems 
in the jail. I55 To deal with the overcrowding, prison officials 
developed the custom of placing prisoners in improper areas, 
posing an unconstitutional risk of harm to Redman's person-
al security. 156 
The Ninth Circuit dealt with personal security issues in the 
context of a eighth amendment challenge in Jordan v. 
Gardner. 157 The court in Jordan, without referring to the delib-
erate indifference standard, rejected the women prisoners' 
challenge to cross-gender pat searches. 158 The court observed 
that although the pat searches may be unpleasant they do 
not violate evolving standards of decency. 159 The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that pat searches are necessary and legitimate 
means of addressing internal security and therefore no eighth 
amendment violation had occurred.160 
154. ld. at 1443-1446. 
155. ld. 
156. ld. But see Lane v. Martinank, 951 F.2d. 360 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 90-
35805) (unpublished disposition, text in WESTLA W, Allfeds Library). The Court reject-
ed a 14th amendment challenge by a pre-trial detainee to the conditions of confinement. 
Lane had claimed that his constitutional rights were violated when he was served 
maggot and boll weevil infested food. The court applied the deliberate indifference 
standard andfound that Lane had failed to show that the prison officials were deliber-
ately indifferent since they replaced the infested meal as soon as it was discovered.ld. 
157. _ F.2d _ (9th Cir. 1992), 1992 WL 2084. 
158. Cross-gender pat searches are when a prison guard pat searches a prison-
er of the opposite sex. The pat searches at issue in this case included a search of the 
breast and crotch area of the prisoner. 
159. Jordan, at *6. The court observed that the Supreme Court has upheld 
prisoner searches more intrusive than the cross-gender pat searches, including body 
cavity searches, these fully clothed searches do not offend modern standards of 
decency.ld. 
160. ld. at *5. The court noted that it was required to give great deference to 
prison officials' policies regarding internal security. Because the cross-gender pat 
searches were implemented for legitimate security purposes they do no amount to the 
"gratuitous infliction of suffering" necessary for a eighth amendment violation. ld. 
Justice O'Scannlain in his dissent pointed out that a eighth amendment violation 
requires that the challenged activity constitute unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain. He noted that the evidence more than supported that there was unreasonable 
risk of harm to the prisoners from the pat searches. Jordan _ F.2d _ (9th Cir. 1992), 
1992 WL 2084 at *9. (J. O'Scannlain concurring in part and dissenting in part) and 
that the searches were unnecessary and without penological justification.ld. at *10. 
Most importantly he observed that the majority completely ignored the issue of 
whether the infliction of pain was wanton.ld. 
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In Whitmore v. Sumner161 the Ninth Circuit addressed how 
the deliberate indifference standard should be applied. 162 The 
court observed that in cases challenging prison conditions, 
the prisoner must prove an objective component, whether 
there was a serious deprivation of rights, and a subjective 
component, whether the prison officials acted with deliberate 
indifference. l63 The court denied that the plaintiffs had provided 
Citing Wilson, Justice O'Scannlain, stated that for eighth amendment claims based 
on conduct that is not part of the formal punishment meted out by ajudge or statute, 
deliberate indifference satifies the wantoness requirement. Furthermore, since the 
prison officials were aware of the negative psychological impact cross-gender search-
es would have on the women prisoners before the policy was implemented, the pris-
oners met their burden of establishing deliberate indifference. [d. at *11. 
161. 944 F.2d 910 (9th Cir.1991)(Table)(No. 89-15540)(unpublished disposi-
tion, text in WESTLA W, Allfeds Library.) Prisoners claimed that their eighth amend-
ment rights had been violated because the prison officials allowed an HIV-infected 
inmate, who had previously thrown his bodily fluids at others, to deliver meals to the 
cells. [d. 
162. [d. See also Schultz v. Goldsmith, 947 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table)(No. 
90-16620) (unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library.)(holding 
that although the prisoner may have shown that his exposure to ETS caused him an 
unreasonable risk of harm, the case must be remanded so that he may amend the com-
plaint to show deliberate indifference.) and see Jordan _ F.2d _ (9th Cir. 1992), 
1992 WL 2084 at *9. (J. O'Scannlain concurring in part and dissenting in part)(not-
ing that a eighth amendment claim includes an objective finding of harm and a sub-
jective inquiry into the prison officials state of mind). [d. 
163. 944 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (unpublished dispositions, text in 
WESTLA W, Allfeds Library). This two prong standard was implied in Wilson,lll S. 
Ct. 2321 and has been consistently applied after Wilson. See, e.g., Smith, 937 F.2d 
613 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 89-15540)(unpublished disposition, text in WEST-
LAW, Allfeds Library) In Smith the Ninth Circuit relied upon its decision in which 
it applied the objective standard prior to Wilson to establish that the challenged con-
ditions in Smith were subject to eighth amendment scrutiny. The court suggested that 
the SUbjective standard be applied to determine whether the prison officials acted with 
deliberate indifference to those conditions. [d. 
See also Johnson v. Williams, 768 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. VA 1991). The court held 
that the restrictions placed on prisoners during a prison lock down did not violate the 
eighth amendment. The court observed, "no eighth amendment claim is stated unless 
plaintiff establishes both that conditions were sufficiently serious and that defendants 
were deliberately indifferent to those conditions.· [d. 
Almost all of the other Circuits that have addressed this issue since Wilson 
have also interpreted the deliberate indifference standard as involving both a subjective 
and objective component. See, e.g., Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 
1991). (held that defendants were deliberately indifferent to prisoners by exposing them 
to freezing temperatures without protection in violation of the eighth amendment). 
The Seventh Circuit observed that certain conditions of confinement, such as providing 
inadequate heat, have been held to be objectively in violation of the eighth amendment 
and that only the subjective element required has changed. [d. 
See also, e.g., Alberti, 937 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1991) (held that state could be 
held liable for the conditions in the jail system but remanded the decision to determine 
if state was deliberately indifferent). The Fifth Circuit observed that Wilson's delib-
erate indifference requirement is not completely separate from the objective require-
ment of Rhodes. [d. To meet the deliberate indifference requirement prison officials 
must be aware of objectively cruel conditions and fail to fix them. [d. 
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enough evidence to satisfy the strict subjective standard 
required after Wilson. 164 
V. THE APPLICATION OF THE DELIBERATE 
INDIFFERENCE STANDARD IN OTHER CIRCUITS 
Because there have been only a few cases decided in the 
Ninth Circuit concerning prison conditions since Wilson, the 
opinions from other circuits may help to define how the Wilson 
test will be applied in the Ninth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit in 
Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, Tex. 166 used reasoning sim-
ilar to Redman to find that the jail and prison officials may have 
been deliberately indifferent to the inmates' rights under the 
eighth amendment. 166 In this case the inmates in Texas jails 
challenged the deplorable conditions of confinement caused by 
severe overcrowding. 167 This overcrowding was caused by the 
state's policy ofleaving "prison ready felons"168 in county jail in 
order to eliminate the state prison overcrowding. 169 The court 
observed that because the state and county chose to leave 
"prison ready-felons" in the jail despite that fact that the over-
crowding made the conditions of confinement unconstitutional, 170 
164. Whitmore, 944 F.2d 910 (9th Cir.1991)(Table)(No. 89-15540)(unpublished 
disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library.) Judge Fletcher in his dissent, 
observed that the plaintiffs had provided sufficient evidence to prove a eighth amend-
ment violation after Wilson. Fletcher stated: 
Here, plaintiffs presented evidence that prison officials placed 
plaintiffs in contact with an HIV-infected inmate who had not 
only thrown his urine at other inmates, but had also engaged 
in self-mutilation in an effort to infect other persons through 
contact with his blood. Plaintiffs also presented evidence 
that suggested that prisons officials had taken precautions to 
protect the staff ofthe correctional facility, but did not show 
similar concern for the safety of the prisoners .... 
Whitmore, 944 F.2d 910 (9th Cir.1991)(Table)(No. 89-15540)(unpublished disposition, 
text in WESTLA W, Allfeds Library.) (J. Fletcher dissenting). 
165. 937 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1991). 
166. [d. at 998-1000. The court noted that the deliberate indifference standard 
would likely be met. However, since Wilson was decided while the case was pending 
review, the court was reluctant to rule that the defendants were deliberately indifferent 
as a matter of law. [d. at 1000. 
167. [d. at 986. 
168. Prison ready felons or ready felons are terms used to refer to persons con-
victed of felonies who are ready to start state prison terms. 
169. Alberti, 937 F.2d at 998-1000. 
170. [d. This case originated over 20 years ago. Various remedial orders and 
preliminary injunctions have been issued to the County and State to make the 
conditions of confinement within the prisons and jails comply with the constitution. 
At this point in the litigation, the State and the County are not disputing the fact that 
the jail is overcrowded and the conditions of confinement are unconstitutional, rather 
they are fighting over who is responsible for the situation. [d. The county contends that 
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they could be found to be deliberately indifferent to the 
prisoners. 171 
The Fifth Circuit also acknowledged that Wilson required 
an additional consideration in the deliberate indifference 
equation. 172 The court observed that when determining if a 
defendant has been deliberately indifferent, the constraints fac-
ing the defendant must be examined. 173 This requires that the 
court consider the possible reasons why defendants may have 
delayed or chosen to maintain certain situations that led to a 
constitutional deprivation. 174 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged 
in Alberti that the State had many common-sense alterna-
tives available other than refusing to admit ready-felons which 
created the overcrowding in the jails. 176 The court also observed 
that the constraints allegedly imposed by lack of legislative 
funding could be considered but would not be dispositive.176 
the jails are overcrowded because of the state's admissions policy that failed to accept 
convicted felons housed in county jails but sentenced to state prison. The state con-
tends that the jail would be overcrowded anyway and that problems existed within the 
jail despite the amount of ready felons. [d, 
The lower court determined that as a result of the overcrowding over 2900 pris-
oners had to sleep on the floor. There also was inadequate plumbing, ventilation, fire 
safety, supplies, food and staff to ensure personal safety. [d. at 990. 
171. Alberti, 937 F.2d 984. 
172. [d. at 998. 
173. [d. The dissent in Redman, 942 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir. 1991).(J. Thompson and 
J. Alarcon, dissenting), also acknowledged that the constraints facing the prison 
officials must be taken into consideration when determining if they were deliberate-
ly indifferent. [d. at 1450. The dissent observed that this is why the courts must defer 
to the prison officials informed decisions because only they understand the compet-
ing concerns that exist within a prison. [d. 
174. Alberti, 937 F.2d 984 at 998-999. 
175. [d. 
176. [d. at 999-1000. The court noted that prior to Wilson, "inadequate funding 
[would] not excuse the perpetration of unconstitutional conditions of confinement." [d. 
(Citing Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1319-20 (5th Cir. 1974)(See infra note 90 for 
a discussion of the case), and that other circuits, including the Ninth, have found delib-
erate indifference over allegations of inadequate funding. [d. (citing Jones v. Johnson, 
781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1985), Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 759 F.2d 
700,705 (11th Cir. 1985) and Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 
1983». The court also noted that this issue is likely to be discussed frequently after 
Wilson since the Supreme Court did not specifically address the issue. [d. 
The dissent in Redman, 942 F.2d 1415, 1450 (9th Cir. 1991)(J. Fernandez, dis-
senting) observed that ifit was found that overcrowding led to the policy ofimprop-
erly placing inmates in situations that pose a risk to their safety and that the prison 
policymakers allowed the facility to be overcrowded, then deliberate indifference 
could be found. Furthermore, the fact that the overcrowding might be a result of eco-
nomics would not change the culpability. [d. at 1456. Justice Fernandez stated, 
"That kind of economics does not define our constitutional rights. In any event, 
economists have expatiated on the value to be found in enforcement of individual rights 
when we wish to encourage people to rethink their attitudes toward imposing risks 
on others in order to save initial outlays of money by themselves." [d. 
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In Henderson v. DeRobertis,l77 the Seventh Circuit suc-
cinctly enunciated what is required to show deliberate indif-
ference. 178 This case involved the issue of whether exposing two 
prisoners to extremely cold temperatures without any protec-
tion violated the eighth amendment.179 The court observed 
that deliberate indifference could be inferred if the prison 
officials had actual knowledge of potential harm to the pris-
oners from the objectively severe conditions, that harm was eas-
ily preventable,180 and yet they failed to prevent it. 181 The court 
found that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the 
defendants knew the inmates were exposed to hazardously 
cold conditions in violation of their constitutional right to 
adequate heat, and they could have avoided the harm to the 
prisoners by giving them adequate protection but did not. 182 
Therefore, their conduct constituted deliberate indifference to 
the prisoners' eighth amendment rights. 18s 
Only one decision to date, Steading v. Thompson, 184 has 
attributed a strict interpretation of the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard, where the prisoners must show that the prison 
officials intended their discomfort.18s In this case, similar to 
McKinney, 186 the court considered whether exposing prisoners 
to ETS constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 187 The court 
held that there was no constitutional violation because when 
the prison officials decided to allow smoking, they did not do 
so with the intent to harm non-smokers.188 Consequently, the 
prisoners had not met the deliberate indifference standard. 189 
177. 940 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1991). 
178. [d. at 1059. 
179. [d. at 1056. 
180. [d. at 1059. The court observed that a prisoners rights to adequate heat has 
long been established and is constant, therefore the defendants had actual knowledge 
that exposing the prisoners to freezing temperatures without adequate protection was 
in violation of the constitution. Henderson 940 F.2d at 1060. 
181. [d. at 1059 (citing Duckworth V. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986) (See infra note 52 for a discussion of the case». 
182. Henderson 940 F.2d at 1060. 
183. [d. 
184. 941 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1991). (held that prison officials were not deliberately 
indifferent to prisoners by exposing them to ETS, since they did not intend to harm 
them by exposing them to such smoke). 
185. [d. at 499. 
186. 924 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Oct. 15 
1991) (vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Wilson). See infra 
notes 85-89 and accompanying text. 
187. Steading, 941 F.2d at 499. 
188. [d. 
189. [d. By requiring this concept of an intent to harm, the court seems to be mis-
takenly applying the malicious and sadistic standard from Whitley, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) 
rather than the deliberate indifference standard. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Most of the decisions in the courts concerning challenges to 
the constitutionality of prison conditions after Wilson have 
applied the deliberate indifference standard as a two-prong 
test. Under this test, the prisoners must prove that the con-
ditions of confinement are objectively severe, and also show that 
the prison officials knew of the severity of the conditions and 
yet chose to ignore or delay the prevention of the harm that 
results from these conditions. Relying on past cases, the 
Ninth Circuit has been able to find that the challenged con-
ditions were objectively severe and resulted in harm to the pris-
oners. Ioo However, on the issue of deliberate indifference the 
court has either found that none existedI9I or remanded with 
doubt that such will be found. I92 Redman 193 is the only Ninth 
Circuit case to date where deliberate indifference has been 
found. The court explicitly indicated in Redman that its anal-
ysis and conclusions pertain only to fourteenth amendment due 
process challenges where a prisoner's right to personal secu-
rity has been violated. I94 
The difficulty that prisoners have had and will likely 
have in the future of showing deliberate indifference in cases 
challanging the conditions of confinement in the Ninth 
Circuit, might be explained by the problems predicted by 
190. See Smith, 937 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 89-15540)(unpublished 
disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds Library)(to deprive prisoners or adequate food, 
clothing, shelter, sanitation, etc, in administrative segregation violates the eighth 
amendment if prison officials act with deliberate indifference). See also Whitmore, 944 
F.2d 910 (Table) (No. 89-15861)(unpublished disposition, text in WESTLAW, Allfeds 
Library) (plaintiffs had not offered enough evidence to prove the subjective component 
of the standard.). 
191. See Whitmore, 944 F.2d 910 (Plaintiff did not offer enough evidence to find 
deliberate indifference), and see Hernandez v. Lewis, 942 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(Table) (No 90-16434)(unpublished disposition, text in WESTLA W, Allfeds Library) 
(holding plaintiff failed to provide any genuine issues of material fact that the prison 
official were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.), Martinak, 951 F.2d 360 
(9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 90-35805) (unpublished disposition, text in WESTLA W, 
Allfeds Library)(no facts suggest deliberate indifference by prison officials), Addleman, 
_F.2d _, (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 99-15651) (unpublished disposition, text in 
WESTLA W, Allfeds Library). (nothing in the record indicates that the prison officials 
were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner). 
192. See Smith, 937 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1991) (Table) (No. 89-15540)(unpublished 
disposition, text in WESTLA W, Allfeds Library)(remanded to District Court on issue 
of deliberate indifference). 
193. 942 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir. 1991). 
194. Id. 
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the concurrence in Wilson 196 and the Amicus Curiae. l96 These 
authorities explained that a subjective component is inap-
propriate in eighth amendment review. Such a standard is 
inappropriate because it is contrary to precedent197 and unsup-
ported by the language, history or intent of the eighth amend-
ment. 198 In addition, these authorities predicted that it may be 
difficult to find fault on the part of the prison officials because 
inhumane prison conditions, unlike specific instances of vio-
lence or inadequate attention to a prisoners medical needs,'99 
often are the result of high demands on the prison officials and 
not the result of an intention to harm the prisoners.2oo 
The concurrence raised another potential problem with 
the use of the deliberate indifference standard: the prison 
official's ability to use lack of resources as a defense to eighth 
amendment claims.201 This defense will enable a prison official 
to claim that it is inadequate funding and not any wrongful 
195. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2321(1991) (White, J., Marshall, J. Blackmun, J. and 
Stevens, J. concurring). 
196. Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae on Writ of Certiorari to The 
United States Court of Appeals for The Sixth Circuit at 11·13, Wilson v. Seiter, 893 
F.2d 861 (1991) (No. 89·7376)(hereinafter cited as U.S. BrieO. 
197. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2328·2329 (White, J., Marshall, J. Blackmun, J. and 
Stevens, J. concurring) (citing Hutto, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) and Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337 
( 1981». 
198. U.S. Brief at 5. The United States explained that the text of the eighth 
amendment does not include any intent language. [d. at 15. Punishment refers to meth· 
ods or kinds of punishment, and cruel refers to the type of prohibited punishment with· 
out respect to intent. [d. Furthermore, the framers had not meant to import an 
intent element; they were primarily concerned with prohibiting tortuous and exces· 
sive methods punishment. [d. at 16. Finally, the United States observed that the 
Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the clause to prohibit barbarity and to pro· 
mote contemporary standards of humanity and decency. [d. 
[d. 
199. [d. at 18 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. 312(1986) and Estelle, 429 U.S. 97 (1976». 
200. [d. at 19. The United States stated: 
[S]eriously inhumane, pervasive conditions should not be 
insulated from constitutional challenge because the offi· 
cials managing the institution have inhibited a conscientious 
concern for ameliorating its problems and have made efforts 
(albeit unsuccessful) to that end ... the failure of the gov· 
ernment to meet inmates' basic human needs constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment whether or not fault can be 
clearly ascribed to the particular officials responsible for 
running the facility. 
See also Branham, When Are Prison Conditions Cruel and Unusual? Preview of 
the United States Supreme Court Cases 1990·1991 Term. Issue No.6 (ABA February 
1991) This article discusses the possible outcomes of the Supreme Court's Wilson v. 
Sei ter decision. 
201. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2330. 
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intent that created the inhumane condition. Although the 
Ninth Circuit indicated in one instance that economic con-
siderations will not be allowed to deprive prisoners of their 
eighth amendment rights,202 and other circuits have also 
observed that states may have to deal with their problems of 
overcrowding without making the legislature the culprit/03 
the Supreme Court dismissed the issue as having no bearing 
on the consideration of whether an intentional element is 
needed for eighth amendment review. 21M Therefore, there still 
is significant opportunity for the Supreme Court to rule dis-
positively on the issue. 
Due to the excessive overcrowding in the prisons and the 
acknowledged lack of available funds to remedy the situation, 
if the Court decides that economic constraints should be con-
sidered in the deliberate indifference equation, the possibili-
ty of a prisoner successfully challenging the conditions of 
confinement will be significantly restricted. 206 Almost any 
inhumane prison condition could be construed to be a result of 
inadequate funds. For example, a prisoners' challenge to lack 
of outdoor exercise could be defended with a claim that lack of 
funds created staff shortages which resulted in the prison 
officials' inability to provide the requisite supervision for out-
door exercise. 
In conclusion, although the Ninth Circuit is bound by 
Wilson, based on the problems inherent in the deliberate indif-
ference standard and the effect it has had on prisoners' 
attempts to challenge the conditions of confinement discussed 
above, it may be a precedent that is worthy of rejection by the 
individual states.206 
The Wilson deliberate indifference standard may be appro-
priate for cases challenging the constitutionality of specific 
instances of conduct that have never been considered part of 
the punishment.207 In cases involving specific instances, like the 
202. See Redman, 942 F.2d 1415 (9th Cir. 1991)(Fernandez, J. dissenting). 
203. See infra note 176 for a discussion of inadequate funding and deliberate indif-
ference. 
204. Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2325. 
205. See Branham, When Are Prison Conditions Cruel and Unusual? Preview of the 
United States Supreme Court Cases 1990-1991 Term. Issue No.6 (ABA February 1991). 
206. However, it should be noted that eighteen states (including California) 
and Puerto Rico, in an amicus brief, sided with the prison officials' position that a sub-
jective element is required. 
207. U.S. Brief at 21. 
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alleged inadequate medical treatment afforded the prisoner in 
Estelle,208 it may be necessary to require a state-of-mind inquiry. 
A subjective inquiry may be necessary to qualify such conduct 
as a constitutional violation since, arguably, mere negligent 
medical treatment does not amount to a eighth amendment vio-
lation. However, because the conditions of confinement are part 
of the penalty of imprisonment, no subjective inquiry is 
required to make them qualify for eighth amendment scruti-
ny. If the conditions are objectively inhumane they violate the 
protections guaranteed by the eighth amendment. The appro-
priate standard therefore is the objective standard described 
in Rhodes. 209 The Rhodes standard properly focused on the 
objective conditions as experienced by the inmates and whether 
those conditions result in the "unquestioned and serious depri-
vations of basic human needs,"2IO or "deprive inmates of the min-
imal civilized measures of life's necessities. "211 
The states may wish to adopt such a standard that is 
appropriately focused on the objective inhumanity of the con-
ditions laid out in Rhodes212 and not on a difficult search for 
deliberate indifference required by Wilson. Under Wilson, 
despite a court's conclusion that a prisoner has been deprived 
of life's basic necessities, it will not be able to provide a rem-
edy because it will be constrained by the arduous search for 
deliberate indifference. 
Amanda Rubin * 
208. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
209. Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). The United States noted that Rhodes was the 
first Supreme Court case to specifically deal with the legal standards applicable for 
general conditions of confinement in the prisons. U.S. Brief at 20. The United States 
also noted that in Rhodes the Court acknowledged that conditions of confinement may 
compose the punishment. [d. 
210. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. 
211. [d. 
212. [d. 
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